





















SHAPLEY AND BANZHAF VALUES
by V. Feltkamp
September 1993
ISSN 0924-7815Alternative aliomatic characterizations of the
Shapley and Banzhaf values
B~- ~'. Feltl:at[ipl ~
-at[;;ttst J, 1~JJ3
Abstract
In a paper in lf)~.í. Dube}' cl,ar:tcterize,l the Shaplec-Shubik index axiomati-
caHy on the class of tnouutcn,ic sin,ple galnCS, IIl 19~3, Dubey and Shapley charac-
terized the Banzhaf intlex iu a siruil:,r ua}'. This pnper extends these characteriza-
tions to aeion,atic ch:uact,.rizarions of tbe ~I,: play' and Banzhaf ~'alues on the class
of control games, on the cla~s of simple garnes nnd on the class of all transferable
u[ility games. lu particular. it is sh„~cu tha[ the additi~'ity axiom tchich is usually
used to characterize these ~:~Ine; on the cla~~ of all transferable utilit}' games can
be w'aakened ~~'itboat ch,,n~.in, thr re;ult.
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'1 thank S.H. Tijs, P Horm. A. ~an den `ouweland auJ S. 11uto for their suggestions and help in
writing this paper.1 Introduction
In a Transferable i.-tilit}~ (TU) game (.`',L~) as modeled by von Neumann and lforgen-
stern (19~~). .~' is a finite set of pla}-ers and the characteristic function v is a real valued
function assigning to each subset .ti of `` its r~.orth, which is to be interpreted as the
maximum gains the conhtion S can guarantee by cooperating.
In politicolog} and sociology, Tl'-gaiues hace been used to study various kinds of vot-
ing situations. Tl,ere, typically, the worths of the coalitions are restricted to {0, 1}. The
interpretation is that the coalitions ti' with worth 1 can decide collectively on the issue
under consideration witl,out the help of plarers outside S. Therefore, these coalitions
are called u~inning. TC'-;ames of this kiud are called simple games and were first consid-
ered in von `eumanu anJ `lorgenstern (19-1-1). Further studies on simple games are e.g.
Shapley-Shubik (19.i-1). Shapley~ (1!)GI), Banzhaf (1965), Shap]ey (1967), Dubey (1975),
Dubey-Shapley (19~9). Pele~ ( í JS1 ), 5óal,let'(1J31), Lehrer (19~8) and Einy (1988).
In the literature, cíiscussion of simple games is mostly coucentrated on monotonic
simple games, based on the ~.oting iuterpretation. However, if the simple games model
not onl}~ theoretical pouer but actual power, monotonicity may be lost. For example in
parliament, a majoritariau coalition ~chiclt is composed of people with opposing interests
might theoretically form a go~eruu,ent, but internal conflict will prevent all bills being
passed. ?~t tlce sawe tin,r, c.~rln,Iiug suuce mecnbers of this coalition might yield a
coalition that succeeds iu passing Lills.
Because traditionall}, simple games are usecl to tnodel voting situations, a solution
coucept on the class of simple grunes is also callyd a poxer index : it measures the
pox.er of a coter. 5hahley anrl Sl:nbik (1J5-1) iutrocluced the Shapley-Shubik index,
which is the Shaple~ ~alue restrictecl to sinil,le gaiues. Dubey (19i~) characterized this
index axiomaticall~ ou tlie class of muuotonic simple games. Another power index is the
Banzhaf index, ~rhicl, ica~ iutro,lucr.,l I,~ Banzl,af (1rJGi) and which was characterizecí
axiomaticall} b} Duhec ;,ucl Shal,le} (1~~!)), again on the class of monotonic simple
games. Eiu} (12~,~) esteu~!r,l tl,c~~c, asiomatic characterizations to several classes of
monotonic TL--games. '1'Lc~ l,rv~ls of tf,e characteriz;itions on the class of monotonic
simple games use niinimal r~:inning roalitiuus, i.e. ~cinuing coalitions such that every
subcoalition is ]osing. 11'lii;~ tl,is c,~ncrl~,t is u;ct~u~al for tnonotonic simple games, it is
not for nonmonotonic sim!,Ir s;um ..
In section 1. a elilForeut liue „f l,roof shu~cs that ~citL axioms sinular to those of
Dube}~ (19i.~), oue can characterizr tlie Sh;,l,ley ~~;clue on the class of control games, the
class of all simple ganies, an~l al~o vu the class uf ;,Il Tl'-games. ~Vith a difierent efficiency
axiom, we also e~teurl tlie cLrrrarterizatiun of ti,e Banzhaf ~'alue to these classes.
2 Axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and
Banzhaf values
.-1 simplc game (~. r) i. a TC'-gan,e iu ~.cLich the range of the characteristic.function u
is {0. 1}. ,~ simple óame c is completelc cleterminerl b}' the set
11'(r') :- { ti C.~" j c~(S) - 1}of winning coalitious.
This definition uf vin,~ile ;;ames ruincides ccith the one given by Dubey ( 19ï5), while
a number of authors, antuiig tlrc.ut ~~un ~eunutn aud ` lorgenstern ( 19~f4) and Shap-
ley (1962) consicler uul} n7oantouic siml,le games, i.e. simple games ( ,1~', v) such that
t~(ti) C t~(T) for all S C T C.~'. Cwiel, Dcrla, aud Tijs (1989) used control games.
These are simple games in ~cltich tLe granel cu.,Iition .~' is winning. tiote that a non-zero
monotonic simplr g;,me is a contrul grin,e.
In the sequel, ~' ~~ill denote an arbitrarc Lut fi~ed set of players and all games will
ha~~e :~' as pla}.er set, unless specifiexl utl,cr~cise. 11'e uften identify the game (;ti', v) with
its characteristic functiun e. `~'e clenote the class of TL--games with player set ,ti' by C'ti~,
the class of simple ;ames ~cith pi.,~er set .~' Lc 5'C'~~, the class of control games with
plat~er set .~~ b} ('C~ au~l the cla,s uf ntonutouic simple games witlr player set .~' by
1.1 ti(,'.v
For real number. u a,n,l L. ~n~ il~~uut~. „ V !, :- rnax{a. L}, and a A b :- min{a, b}. For
TC-games u. tc E G~~, vV tt~ and c ~ tr clenote tlre games defined by
(t'Vu')(S):-c(S)Vtu(ti) forallSC.ti
(t~~t,')(ti):-r(ti)ntc(S) forallSC.Y.
For each of the clas,es uf sirn~,le g,,rn~.,, control gantes ancí monotonic simple games it
holds that if t~ aud ,c are iu t;u. clas:. ~u arr r V tr and c ~ u~.
:-', soluhore cnncrpt ur ruluc un a rlass C~~ C C,'~~ of TC-games is a vector calued
function t~ : C~ ~ R~, a,.,igui„g tbe rc.rl uuruLcr c~,(c) to each pla}~er i in the gatne
t' E C~.
`,`'e proceed bc pro~ i,lin~ sun,r inoi,crtir; uf a~ulution concept on a class C'ti~.
~.-', solutiun c~ is r,r?;rr, nt if ~,E~. c;i,rt - t~( ~ 1 tur al] games r E C'~.
~,~ solutiou ,-~ is ar,on!tnrurrs if fur .,ii r E C~ tu,~l fur all permutations a of .ti~ such
that at~ E C `.
~chere tLe oa;nt~ .7r i~ ,4~liur~l L~,
for all i E ~-,
or'i til - t'Irïi ~)I fur all ti C.~'.
~.~ ,rull playu iu a ~arnr r E C'~' i~ .~ l,l:r.cr i E ~' such tl,at u(5') - c(.S ` {i}) for
all ti C `' coutainiur~ r.
.~ solution t~ has tlte nul! p,(rt~rr propcrty i f r.~,(r~) - 0 for all gatnes t~ E C, ~eith
null pla~er i.
~.~ rarrierof a game c E C~ i~ a c~,,~;itiun T- `' such that c(,S) - u(S(1 T) for all
SC.~'.
~ solution i. has the ca,rin~ Inoprrt~ if ~,tT c~,(r) - r(T) for all games u E C'~
and each carrirr T uf r.t
~.~ solutiun t' has thc~ hrtu~ft r pro;,erlt. i(
,. (t~ v tr') t,.'(t~ n tr~) - i~(t~) t t'(~)
for all games c. u' E C~ such tl~at r V tu, r n tr E C'~.
~ .~ solutiou is ndditrrc if
t Ii -F tu) - 4'(t') t V(u')
for all games r, u~ E ~~ sucL tLat c' f rr E C'~.
The tollowing should Le nute~] : if Ci`~ C l'i ancl a solution :r~ satisfies any of the
properties nanie,l at,u~r un C~, it sati,fies tLe pruperty on the class Ci~~ as well. On
the class of coutrul g;ttnes, tl,e a~l~liti~it~ prul,ert~ is useless : all control games have a
Hinning grand cualitiun. Lence tl;e s;trn uf h~~o ci,utrul games is nut a control game.
Furthennore, a ~al~te ~cltich is a,leliti~e vu C;` satisfies the transfer propertti' on C'ti~
and hence also un an~ sul,cla;s. Tu pru~e tk,i;, tal:e t', u' E G'~. Then, using additicity,
o(c~vu')foít'ntc) - 0(uVwtunwj
O(t~ f u')
0( t') t O( u').
Finall~~. ~~~e note that tl,e c.,rrrr (,ro(,rrty is equi~alent to the efficiency and null player
properties together.
.-i wi~lel}' shnlied ~u;uti~.:: c~,ur~ l~t i~ tLe SY,nple~ ralue o(cL Shaple}~ (1953)) of a
game r F C~. ~íefine~l I,c
'.`~', ti'!ti``fr111
`-',Icl- ~ ~ n
i f (t'k~)-t'(S~~))
. ~. ~~` I .
for all r E~'. }lere. ;~: ,I~~n„t~rs tLe canliu.~litc of the set S.
It is ~cell knu~~~u tLat thr SLal,h~~ ~;Jne is ~~Ilicii'nt, anonymous, additive and satisfies
the null pla~er prupert~ un ~;~ an~l hr~nce un ruty subclass uf G''~~. The retnark abo~'e
sho~cs that it sati~tir, th~' tr;~u~f,'r ;,r~,;,rrt~ on at~~. clnss of TL'-games.
The f,;llo~cing tltc~un~ut ~~'u~'r~;lize~ 7Gc,urrn ll in DuLey (19i5).
Theorem 1 ThP ,nti,lne ~;,Inr un thr rl.,~s ul cunuul games satisfying efficiency, ano-
n~'mit}', the null pl.,~rr ;,ny,~~:t~ ;u;~l tLc~ transf~~r;,ro;,ert} is the Shaplec ~-alue.
Proof : It is clear that tlte ~i;a;,l~'~' ~.,lne ~ati~fit~s the four properties mentioned in the
throrem. Suppo~e a,uluti„u cuuc~'i,t ~. „n satisfies these four properties as ~ceíl. ~1'e
pro~~e t' coincicles ~cith the SL;,;,l~~~~ ~~tlur o.
FirsL Duhe~ ( I!)~.il ;~a,c,~~l that t!;r ti!;a;,l,'~ ~:tlue is the unique ~~alue on the class
of monutonic sitnple etnu'~ ~ati~f~ i;,~ ,ut„n~ uiir~ ,rucl the carrier and transfer properties.
The carrier propertc is eclui',rrl~~t,t tu rllicicuc~~ au,l tlte nulí player propPrty combined.
hence t~ coinrieles ~':i:L t!;e tiL:,(,;r}' taln~~ un this class.
lu order to estencí thi~ re~nlt to tlte cl;;ss of ;rfl coutrol games, ~e introduce the Dirac
games 6~ defiuecl L~ -
I ifT-ti,
r'~'TI- 0 if7'~S.:j
Let the control games F', he ilefin~~~l l,~' t~, - F; t F~-. lote that ( us - ás) V á~ - uc and
(u., - á;) n óti - á~- - u,~ for all ti C ~~. I-,ing the transfer propert}' and the fact that
u; - F; is a eontrol game ~ct. uLtain
t'(it~") t t.'(It;) - t-'(Iti - FS) t L'(F;)'
Hence i'Íá~) - 1-'(u.v) } t'(u~) - t~i u; - ~~;)
(~t 0( u~; I t G( u ;) - G( u; - F; )
f?1
~(á~)
H'here (1) follows frum the munototucit~' uf u~., It;, u, - bs and coincidence of ríi and b
on the class of monotonic sitn),le ~atne., au,l (''j I,ecause the Shapley ~.alue Q satisfies
the trausfer propert~'.
~ote that ant' arLitrar~' conuol grttnr t~ c.ui Le ~~ritten
r - U F'7.
TEIt'(~)
~ti'e pro~-e r;~(v) - o(t~) for all c E CG'~~ I,c induction on ~lY'(v)~ :
ra if ~Li'(t~)~ - 1, tlteu v- u,~, ~~hich is munotonic, hence y(v) - 0(u).
~ if ~[1~(r)~ - 2, then c- ó~ for suttte T C ~~, l,ence y.~(v) - 0(v).
~ C'hoose k ? 2 an~l su),;iuse ,. (c) r~,iucitl~s ~~ith o(v) on all games r E CG'~~ w'ith
lil"Icl~ C l'. Tal:e a ót,ine t~ v;ilh II'ir.)! - l: i 1, and choose a T E lV(v) ~{a'}.
Then z~ - ÍI' - FT) V!'r. (t' - Ft~; P~ ,~.t. - ,t~. and II'(r - áT) - Ii'(z.) ~ {T}, so
jlt'(r - áT)! - b'. Ilruct~ ln' tL,. tr:u,~ï~.r ~~~i,nn auel the induction h~'pothesis
t'(t'1 - ~~t'-'~T~-t'(Fr)-~'(u.v)
- ~,, ,. - ,c.r~ ~ o(FT) - o(u.')
- ;;i~~).
This pro~'es the unit)nenr~~ ~,f u s„I~u i~,u ~~Iti~~~'iti,; tlte four properties on CC~~. O
-11oug the same lines une ran ;,n,~,e
Theorem 2 The nniyue ~~~;ue uu tlie c!~~~~ uf',i~n),;e games satisf~~ing efficiency', anony-
mit~', the nnll pla~'er;~ru;,rrt~ .u~~l tl,e uausf~~r ),r~,),ert} is the Shapley' calue.
[n order to characterize the SL~,),Ir~' ~'nlue on tL~~ class of all Tli-games, we first need
some lemmas. The zero gmne in C;~ i, ~lt~u.,t~~~l I,c II.
Lemma 3 Let t' Le a sulutiuu on G~ satisf~in; tlte transfer propertp, K'ith v(0) - 0.




Proof : ~1'e pro~'e in tlir~~e ste),. tliat e~~na!iuu (1) hul~ls.1. For the class of all n~u-ueoati~r games t~ tl,e proof is by induction on
A~(r) - ~{S C.~' ~ c(S) ~ 0}~.
(A game r is nuu-negati~~e if r( ti)~ 0 for nll S C.~~.)
~ If k(t,) - 0 tben t~ - Q and so ,.lr) - d-~se.ti~ u~(u(S)ós).
~ Take k 7 0 an~l ~u~~~~~~~c ec~natiou (11 hol,f~ for all non-negati~.e games v w.ith
~~( t~) C k. Fur a n~,;:-ne~,.~ti~~e óan:e c ~~ ith k(r) - k, choose a coalition T C,V
such that r(T) ) 0. Then k(r - r(T)6T) - k- 1, hence using transfer and
the induction hJ~puthe~i~. ~~e obtain
t'(r) - t~l~~ - t~(T)~~r~ ~- o';''(T)~T~ - ~'~(t'- u(T)ór) ~ t~(T)hT~




- ~, L (t'( ti)~S).
~ ~'
2. For non-positi~e ganu~s uue pru~es analogouslv ( interchanging maxima and min-
ima) that equatiuu (1) I,ul~i~.
3. For an arbitran Qame r, iu~. tlte tr;~usfer proprrt}~ to u~rite
~-'(t~) - ~.~i,~~t,.~(ill
- ,,~:.viilt,..(,.,n)
- ~;~.'Í tc V ÍI)( 5'~j~~) ~ r-.((t' n ~)1 ~)óS)1
- ~ ~'(rf ~)rc:).
;` ~'
Hence equation (1) lwl~l~ fur t~',l TI--~;uuc~. O
Remark The cuii~~c,rs~~ i~ ;~1~„ trnr : If a~olntiuu coucept i~ on G~` satisfies equa-
tion (1) for all ganm~ r E(~'`~ tln~n ~.~ sutislics tlte trausfer propertv and t~(0) - 0.
~1'hile lemma 3 shons tli;,t a~~,I~ttiou cuncri,t satisf}'ing the transfer property~ is de-
ternuned b~. i'. ~al,re uu nutltil,lr. c,f Dirac ~an,rs, the next lemma sho~~.s it is also
determined !,~ tts caÍnes un nutlti~,les uf uu,,uin,itc games.
Lemma 4 Let .~' be fi~e~l. S~tp;,,,~e fur et~,~h S E 3~`~ `{0} and for each real number n,
a ~~ector t~~., E R` is gi~-en. ~;,tisl~ iu~ ,.,,, -.0 fur all ti' E 2` `{0}. Then there exists
a unique solution conrept un C~ .r,tinf~ ing the trrwsfer pruperty, such that
t~(ot~,l - ,.~,,,; for rtll n' c R ancl all S E 2'ti `{~}. (2)Proof : First we pro~e uuicit~. 5u(,pc.~c there e~ists a solution rr~ satisfying equation (2)
and the transfer prupert~. Then t(Ilj - t-~(pu~.) - t;~o,.`. - 0. Hence according to
]ernma 3, equation (1) Lc,lcl~, nu~l r~ppl}~ing it tu the game au~, we obtain
'-'o.s - t:'(ou.i) - ~ t'(o~T)
r:,;
forallaER,fora11SE3'~~`{0}. (3)
For each fixed a this fiuite s~st~~m of linear equxtions (with variables Wo,~ and ~(aÁy),
S E'l'~~ ~{0}) is easily~ itnersrd, ~ ic-Idiug
t~(ot~T) -~(-1)~'~T~ t~,,.; (or all n E R and al] T E 2'~ ~{0}. (4)
~ ,,~T
Hence b}' equation (1).
1 ~
~~~(t'I - ~ ~ (- 1 )~, ' ~.',~(T~.S for all TL'-games v, (J)
TC.~' ~..~,.T
which implies v~ is uuique.
This constructiou of r.~ pro~es e~i~t~.nce a~ rc~,ll : gi~en the numbers 4,a,s for all a E R
and S E 2'v ` {~}, cunstruct a,ol~rti„n ~.~ first on Dirac ga[nes, using equation (4) and
then on all TL--gamrs usíng r~;natic,n (1 }. This solution r.~ will then satisf}' equation (1),
hence it satisfies the tr.uts;c~r ~,xi~,tn. It al.u satisfies equatiou ('?), so it is the solution
concept asked for. p
Csing this letnina. ~~r n"~~ ;,ru~~~
Theorem 5 The SLr~~,l~} ~,~lu~~ i~ tli~~ ,ir.ic;u~. c;~lne vn G~~ satisfving efficienc}~, anony-
mi[~~, the null pla}er;,n,i~ert~ ~unl tLo tr;,u~frr (~;oper[t'.
Proof : ~~'e alrea,l~~ note~l tlint tLc~ tii,a;,lc~ ~r,lnr satisfies the four properties. To pro~'e
uniqueness, let t~ Lr a~alnr that ,ati~li~~, tli~~ G,nr (,rc,perties mentioneeL C'onsider a
game of the form ccu;. [i~ tLe nuil ;~I,~~.~,~r (,n,;,c.tt~~. ~~,(nu;) - 0 if i is not a member of




~ r if i E ti
for some real numLer .r. l~l'irirn~ ~ tii,~a ~,ir!~i; ;~;.r - ctzr.,(.~') - a and r - anSj.
Hence t~ is determiu~~l ~,u n~:ii'i~,l~.~ ~,f uiuuiiinit~ g,cmes, a. (Uu~) - 0 for all nonempt}~
coalitions S, and ;rntmrc 1 iu:;,!ir~ iu,i,~nc iic,~. O
.~lnother soluti~,n rourr(,t is thr U,r,rarnj ~~;il~te r) (cf. Qanzhaf ( 1965), Owen ( 19ï5)),
defined on C~ b~ .
tl,(t') - ~;t~l ti) - z~(S~ f)1
for all i E~~. It is easil~~ sec.n that the I3;,nzL~,f ~~tclue satisfies anon~~tnitv, additivitv and
the null pla}er propc~rt~. I3rii~g .ul~!iti~,~, it sati-fi~~, the transfer propertt~ as well. lotethat it does not satisfc elfici~.nc~. Ur~fiue i7(r) :- ~,E,v r7,(n). 1'ow the characterization
by Dube}. and Shal,le} í 1!li:)j uf the Banzhaf ~alue on the class of monotonic simple
games can be extenrle~ tu chararctr~rizations on the class of all simple games and the
class of all Tl'-ganu~s. .~11ong simil;~r lines as [heorems 1, 2 and 5 one can show
Theorem 6
1. The Banzhaf ~'alur is thr unirinr ~nlue r.. on C'G'~~ satisfting anon}'mity', the null
player property. aurl the tr;uis(er property such that
~ t',(t') - i7(r~) for all z~.
,E~'
(6)
2. The Banzhaf ~~alue is the unirlue calue v on SG~` satisfying anonymity, the null
player property~, tlte u~ausfer prupert~~ aurl (G).
3. The Banzhaf calue is the uuique ~'alue ti' on C'~ satisfy.ing anonymity, the null
player property', the transfer f~ropcrt}' aud (6).
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